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Abstract: 
This editorial introduction discusses the problematic ‘demonology’ of spatial analyses that 
attempt to understand the logic of the social in terms of subject-based origins. Taking the 
poststructuralist notion of decentred subjectivity to task, it uses the metaphor of exorcism to 
approach everyday life as a haunted space. Instead of identifying the true demons behind the 
voices rendering an account of everyday life, it shifts methodological attention to the 
incommensurable multiplicity of traces through which we map and narrate a hermeneutics of 
becoming.  
 
Identity Thinking and the Problem of Exorcism 
Analysing social practices has always been an essential part of sociology and anthropology, if 
only as a means of grounding the otherwise highly speculative claims made by general 
theoretical abstractions. In doing so, social scientists in general have for a long time been pre-
occupied with behaviour, which in turn point backwards towards ‘reasons’ (sociology), 
‘motivations’ (psychology), ‘interests’ (political science), and ‘myths’ or ‘rituals’ 
(anthropology).  This pointing-backwards was also often a pointing-inwards, in which the 
inner state of the human being takes on the role as cipher, containing the codes and passwords 
for understanding the otherwise mysterious nature of the social.  
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When such a sociology, whose ultimate project is to uncover the causality of events, is 
applied empirically, it starts to resemble pre-modern forms of exorcism. Confessions are 
forced out of subjects who are deemed possessed by the latent effects of social structures, and 
whose demonic nature can be revealed using appropriate methodologies. The idea of 
‘possessed speech’ has been invoked by Michel de Certeau in The Writing of History and the 
Mystic Fable to describe the elusive and ephemeral nature of ‘voices in the text’.  
In his analysis of possessed speech, de Certeau focuses on the relation of present, individual 
utterances to a set of interpretative systems, and on the “marks” by which the possessed are 
called to position themselves in these systems’ (Ahearne, 1995: 86). 
It is obvious that social sciences are approaching the data, elicited from questionnaires, 
interviews and ethnographic observations in a similar vein. Data-elicitation is a form of 
exorcism. The exorcism performed by the pseudo-scientific method of the empirical 
sociologist functions to make the demons (latent causes) reveal themselves in speech. In an 
act of exorcism, demons are called upon to identify themselves in a battle of wills. This 
mainly serves to secure the classificatory systems of the exorcist, which often proved to be 
worthless when facing a multiplicity of demons deemed responsible for a single act of 
possession. 
A similar critique of social science can be found in Sourayan Mookerjea’s contribution to this 
volume. Criticising Arjun Appadurai’s (e.g. 1990) grid of disjunctive global flows as reifying 
the abstraction of scape whilst flirting with a ‘human version of chaos theory’, Mookerjea 
suggests that imposing classificatory scapes onto the complexity of global flows neglects their 
primacy as narrative figures. Instead the author offers a ‘horizontal allegory’, a radical 
localization of the narrative figure in a cinematic exploration of identity. He bases his own 
analysis on the film Calendar. 
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In an interesting twist, Mookerjea suggests that the film itself accomplishes a radical 
undermining of subject-centred identification by revealing a difference of difference through 
repetition. ‘When the identity of things dissolves, being escapes to attain univocity, and 
begins to evolve around the different’ (Deleuze, 1994: 67). The search for an originary form 
is futile, because we are deprived of the universal Eye/I of the transcendental Subject. In the 
absence of a narrative that expresses a transcendental grounding, identifications reveal 
nothing. In terms of de Certeau’s analysis, the duplicitous voices of the demons possessing 
the subject will always utter lies.  
Post-structuralism, and in its wake a range of theoretical critiques clumsily gathered together 
under the label of the post-modern, has of course devoted a most serious attack on any 
subject-centred (or centred-subject) form of (authorized) understanding Being. Critically re-
asserting Nietzsche’s relentless epic struggle against moralist idealism, this de-centring of the 
subject proved to be an essential turning point not only in philosophy, but also across the 
social sciences and humanities. That is to say, the mysteries of the social cannot be unlocked 
by simply invoking the interiority of the subject as a constitutive ordering device. Exorcism 
does not reveal any fundamental grounding yet latent, truth. 
However, whereas demons make dubious allies and cannot be trusted, they do still have 
tremendous revealing power. That is to say, once we abandon the assumption that exorcism 
delivers an original – or to speak with Derrida (1982), once we accept that difference comes 
before any metaphysics of presence – we are still left a multiplicity of voices assembled under 
the figure of possession.  
In his answers to questions following his paper on hyperreal America, Jean Baudrillard 
reiterates his famous and celebrated concept of simulacrum and states that ‘the very 
distinction between false and true is impossible’ (see Richard Smith, this volume). Suggesting 
- years before the Truman Show - that ‘life in America can be considered as a film … you 
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cannot distinguish between a movie and America’, again points to the relative obsoleteness of 
methods that seek to extract ‘truth’ out of confessions of those ‘caught in the act’ (of living 
the American Dream). Like Jim Carey’s Truman, they are unsuspecting actors acting without 
scripts, in hyperreal arrangements, propped up by deliberate placements of covert 
advertisements and artefacts. Trying to elicit these secret but non-existing scripts indeed 
merely induces paranoia and a further thickening of the plot. 
Indeed, there is no reason why we should not perform exorcisms of the demons of ‘social 
actors’. Indeed, social science has no other purpose than to exhort confessions. However, we 
should approach them for what they are – duplicitous utterances: always eccentric and 
moving outwards. Exorcism is an opening-up of series of narratives that decentre subjectivity. 
 
Thinking Exteriority: Embodiment and Spatialization 
This decentring, however, also has a profound effect on how we conceptualize ‘exteriority’. It 
is here that spatio-temporality prominently comes to the fore. By shifting the ground away 
from an interiority/exteriority Gestalt (Levi Strauss’ structuralism is perhaps the perfect 
culmination of this), attention moves towards ‘the relational’. A concept such as 
intersubjectivity (or intertextuality) provides a useful illustration of how to conceptualize de-
centred being-in-the-world. As it highlights the in-between of subjects and thus belongs to no 
subject in particular, it forces one to consider the space that would otherwise simply be 
glossed over as void. Suddenly, what happens between matters most. 
The relational imperative of theorizing decentred subjects (exteriority) thus immediately 
invokes the concept of (social) spatialization. Whilst this is indeed a rather self-evident and 
perhaps even crude conclusion, it is remarkable that very little attention has actually been paid 
to this, with the notable exception of a few theorists, such as Bakhtin, Lefebvre and de 
Certeau. Each in their own way, they have made consistent efforts to come to terms with the 
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‘void’ of relational space, by focusing on language (dialogue), material practices and 
everyday life. They have thereby also transformed the concept of space and taken it beyond 
the formalistic axioms of geometry; transforming the ephemeral character of spatialization 
into a dynamic enigma.  
Whereas the spatiality of the decentring of the subject has been relatively neglected, another 
kind of ‘materiality’ opened up by exteriority has not: embodiment. Although the shift from a 
centred subject to embodiment is certainly highly compatible with the theorizing the 
problematic of relational being – and specifically Butler’s (1990, 1993) work on 
performativity springs to mind here – the attention given to embodiment processes has been 
rather biased towards the body, rather than embodied practices. The body, being read as a 
surface of cultural inscription, thereby is at risk of taking on the form of a pseudo-interiority, 
especially when taken as equivalent of a subject. The problematic then becomes one of 
correspondence – how does the body engender expressions of subjective interiority? The 
quest becomes, once more, one of wholeness. Desire becomes, once again, overcoded in the 
language of the Oedipus Complex, a desire to be One, authentic being. When this happens, 
we are again trapped in a metaphysics of presence. 
If we are to sustain the logical coherence of decentring the subject, we must constantly remind 
ourselves of the exteriority of desire; never let our discourse slide back into one of 
identicality, the corresponding identities of body and subject that can be revealed through 
exorcisms. We must situate the desire for identity, for the wholeness of the body-subject, as 
an exteriority. This is why it is analytically fruitful to speak of embodiment rather than the 
body, and to articulate this in terms of spatialization rather than space. This is not to say that 
we should not speak of the body, identity or space at all; far from it, they remain very useful 
expressions of the processes that come before it: embodiment, identification and 
spatialization.  
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The mission of Space and Culture is a rewriting of research agenda’s, and of concepts, so that 
whenever we come across the term ‘body’ or ‘space’ we are actually reminded of their 
inauguration in terms of the desires that have solidified them as concepts. It is not to impose a 
new language, but to refresh our memories and sharpen our analytical grasp (also see 
Angerer, 1998). It is to develop a methodology of exorcism that is more faithful to its 
hermeneutic-existential problematic, and as such reflexive about writing itself. We need 
methodologies that operate critically within and without metaphysics of presence, iterating 
between both molar and molecular forms of being and becoming. To put it more plainly: 
whereas communication always draws in discursive practices, this does not mean that we 
should not deviate from the norms they impose. This is the essence of performativity: one 
invokes and thereby traverses boundaries set-into-work via dialogic encounters.  
Such a ‘protocol’ means much more than simply ‘being reflexive’. It is certainly not a matter 
of externalising one’s imagined self autobiographically, so that one shares oneself with 
imagined readers. If reflexivity means anything, it must go beyond the metaphor of the 
mirror, which Lacan (1977) so effectively deployed in an allegory of the coming into being of 
a subject. The question of possession emerges again: what are we confronting when 
reflexively calling forth our own demons? Obviously, when we speak with a multiplicity of 
voices, we will also increase the number of stories.  A methodology of possession is not a 
means of becoming-demon; as one would lose the very performativity of exorcism. Instead it 
is a mode of exteriorization; one goes beyond the black box of the unified Idea/Subject and 
actively cultivates the in-between. 
The basic premise of identity thinking is a desire for unification between representation and 
authenticity. This is achieved when the difference between being and language ceases to exist. 
In spatial terms, such a desire represents itself perhaps most emphatically as a world in which 
the light has become omnipresent: when there are no longer any shadows for demons to lure 
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in. The shadow is of course the classical figure that stands as the originating myth of the 
entire tradition of western metaphysics. It starts in Plato's famous allegory of the cave, where 
it plays the role of the impostor; revealing an untruth. First a distortion, than a manipulation, 
and finally a fallacy, the shadow is that which the philosopher must overcome and render 
obsolete. Plato’s search for perfection forced him to assume that between the world of ideas 
and the world of things, there is no place for the shady simulacrum, which is neither original 
not copy, but a deceiver, that counters the will to know with the fear of knowing (Deleuze, 
1994). However, as Deleuze argues, the simulacrum may be all we have left once 
representations have been stripped from the mythical idealism that grants them this divine 
status as Ideas. 
The shadow belongs to the twilight zone, the world of liminality, of deviance and impurity; it 
is the figure of the in-between. The shadow emerges when light encounters an obstacle as it  
spatializes its being-in-the-world; the shadow marks that other side of the object, its 
unconscious, to speak with Freud. Its darkness hides all secret fears and desires. The shadow 
marks non-being, the nothing that is no thing, from which all sense emerges.  
Hence, just as shadows are essential for more realistic representation in, for example, 
computer graphics, so are they indispensable for social spatialization. It is as if we are again 
in Plato’s cave but now refusing to follow the philosopher’s daydreaming about losing the 
chains and looking straight into the light. Instead, we are still looking at the shadows on the 
wall, the simulacra that haunted this great philosopher until the very end and which he tried to 
banish. The shadows, however, no longer represent ‘objects’ but have become flows; they 
entail variations and differentiations only in intensity, not essence. Without having to resort to 
any other authentic being than the shadow-flow itself, we do not have to make up stories 
about origins of Being. Instead, the matter at hand is pure performativity.  
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A second figure can be used to illustrate this further: resonance. What the shadow does to 
vision and spatiality, resonance does to hearing and temporality. The resonance is sound that 
comes after, it is a trace that marks the vanishing event, the present that never sustains. 
Resonance is what Derrida (1982) called 'differance' - a difference that defers. Resonances 
can be harmonious as well as dissonant. In harmony, they are attuned to their destiny and 
amplify the sound-waves. However, in dissonance, the resonance is a remainder that breaks 
the unity of the whole and marks a minus-in-the-origin, that element that does not belong, a 
matter-out-of-place.  
Sound-traces, or resonances, are of course not purely temporal, as they set into work the 
specific acoustics, hence space. Likewise, shadows also mark temporality; the earliest forms 
of time measurement used the length of shadows to indicate the time of day. However, 
whereas the relationship between the object and its shadow is relatively immediate and 
mimetic, the relationship between a sound and its resonance is always necessarily delayed. 
We need both figures if we are to make sense out of spatialization in cultural analyses and do 
justice to its im/materiality. 
Both shadow and resonance are arche-typical forms of spatialization. They highlight that 
space is always relative and relational to the entities that constitute it (Heidegger, 1986), be it 
an object of reflection or an utterance of enunciation. Space is thus articulated in particular, 
temporal mediations; hence, it is 'indexical'. Indexicality is a term used by Garfinkel (1967), 
who appropriated it within a phenomenological perspective to describe the necessity of the 
particular, context-specific and relational character of understanding any enunciation. 
Shadows and resonances are indexical forms of spatialization because they only make sense 
in relation to the specific situations in which they emerged into being. Shadows are always 'of' 
some entity, just as resonances always belong to some utterance of sound. They only become 
figures of obscurity if they lose their indexicality.  
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However, indexicality can be used in a second way, which relates not to a phenomenological, 
but to a more hermeneutic tradition; in particular that of the pragmatic language philosopher 
Charles Sanders Peirce (1940). Peirce used the term 'index', as a category in between 'icon' (a 
form of signification that works through resemblance) and 'symbol' (a form of signification 
that works through a complex system of rules). For Peirce, the index is a form of signification 
that operates on the basis of a natural referential relationship, such as smoke in relation to fire. 
According to Eco (1977), the index must be seen as a relational signifier that operates on the 
basis of material tracing, but without exclusively those of cause-and-effect (Van Loon, 1996). 
That is, an index is like a trace of something else, indicating that this 'other entity' was once, 
but no longer, 'present'. Here, the shadow and the resonance are indices of particular entities 
and utterances, whose presence is deferred by the difference that has set these figures 'into 
work'. Combining both notions of indexicality, we can see how it relates to spatialization. 
Spatialization takes place through indexicality. In this sense, space is always particular and 
relational and as such, constitutes the primary form of cultural analysis, which always 
requires a specific attunement to particular modes of sense-making that are relational. 
Both embodiment and spatialization can be conceptualised in terms if ‘flow’. Flow allows us 
to see the continuities of singularities and their becoming-part of assemblages. Flow allows us 
to engage with the ephemeral nature of in-between-ness; it indexes movement, speed and 
frequency (Shields, 1997). It is not concerned with describing and thereby regulating 
boundaries, separating interiority from exteriority, triggering politics of inclusion and 
exclusion (Van Loon, 1997). Flow also breaks with the opposition between ‘actual’ and 
possible’. Instead, it is virtual (Shields, 2000). 
Our concept of flow is therefore rather different from Manuel Castells’ (e.g. 1996 Ch.6). He 
conceptualises flow as opposed to place as ‘purposeful, repetitive, programmable sequences 
of exchange and interaction between physically disjointed positions held by social actors’ 
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(ibid: 412).  The space of flows is that domain of the information-order where power and 
wealth are being accumulated; it is the dominant and dynamic realm of the network society. 
The realm of information and communication technologies and market transactions 
determines the speed of social changes and enforces ‘progress’ and ‘economic growth’. In 
contrast, the space of places is the mundane, banal world of everyday life. Governed by 
inertia rather than speed, it continuously reminds us of the resistance of atoms (as opposed to 
bits, i.e. Negroponte, 1995). Spatial and temporal obstacles still matter; it is the world where 
bodies are ‘at work’ and cannot be transcended.  
 
The Performativity of Everyday Life 
This opposition suggests that flows have no place in everyday life; that material inertia is 
somehow incompatible with flow. Associated with a process of de-materialization (e.g. 
digitalisation) and acceleration, flow thus becomes the antithesis of matter and inertia. This, 
however, is mistaken. Flows (even light) always involve particles (e.g. photons). Even bits 
have a materiality (albeit sub-molecular). Moreover, speed is not always the same as 
immediacy or acceleration. Flows may also slow down. 
Work on time (Adam, 1998; Hofmeister and Spizner, 1999) clearly shows that everyday life 
consists of a multiplicity of rhythms. Everyday life thus entails a range of flows, each with 
their own ‘proper time’ (e.g. duration, pace, frequency). Likewise, we could argue that 
everyday life consists of a multiplicity of spatializations, including forms of embodiment. If 
we were to use ‘space of places’, we would have to bear in mind the inherently dynamic, 
volatile, contested, unstable and multiplicitous (rather than duplicitous) nature of ‘place’. 
The variability of materiality and velocity of flows in everyday life makes it extremely 
difficult to provide general theoretical abstractions. This is why work on everyday life has to 
resort to a variation of abstractions, including very limited ones, that exclusively engage with 
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the mundane and banal on their own terms. This is also why simple applications of general 
theory to studies of everyday life will not work. Instead, taking everyday life seriously means 
a reversal of abstraction. Theorizing must evolve through the flows of being-in-the-world, and 
this is very much a reflexive process. 
Mirjana Lozanovska’s article in this volume provides an excellent example of such grounded 
work. Starting from the mundane problematic of ‘mapping’, she appropriates de Certeau’s 
critical notion of historiography to de-scribe the coming-into-being of the Macedonian village 
of Zavoj as a place. Orthographic projection (another form of exorcism) leaves this place 
empty, cold and ultimately misleading. Instead, Lozanovska turns to the traces left by 
experiences, most importantly narratives and practices (especially domestic labour). The 
architectural frontiers only come to life (as objectifications of space) by means of ‘being in 
the world’. Although consisting of much more than the movements of domestic labour (which 
in Zavoj are almost completely externalised), much of the spatialization of Zavoj takes places 
through the routines and repetitions of everyday practices. It is the moving body of 
(especially) women that ‘continuously binds the domestic domain. Here a clear example of 
the interconnectedness of embodiment and spatialization becomes evident:  
The shuttling of her body is like a reel of thread that produces a weave of all the dispersed 
buildings, a complex knit of the domestic space in which her body id totally enmeshed. The 
domestic domain is produced as a unity, a well-functioning unified front (Lozanovska, this 
volume, p000). 
It is the ordinary everydayness of being-in-the-world that sets limits to any method of 
representation. Simply acts of mapping or describing everyday life already prove to be too 
complex, too versatile, too evasive, for any stable exorcism to render a convincing account. 
As Llyod Jenkins’ descriptions of 11, Rue du Conservatoire (this volume) convincingly 
shows. Flows of temporalization and spatialization can never be gathered in a cumulative 
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sense. The ephemeral nature of everyday life makes full accounting impossible. What we are 
left with are traces, with which we can create maps and tell stories. Only through an interplay 
between repetition and deviation can we begin to suggest that there is indeed an integral 
‘place’; only through differentiation can we deduce from this integrity a sense of direction or 
fate (flow). With every trace opened up, however, we risk unleashing yet another demon to 
lead us astray so that we wander off, once again, into another domain. 
 
Conclusion 
Everyday life has become a central concern for geographers, historians and architects. In each 
of these ‘disciplinary approaches’ such concerns are juxtaposed onto concepts of space and 
culture. But this has very little purchase if we fail to shift our methodological apparatus away 
from the grid of exorcism. Possession is not a matter of interiority but of exteriority. Demons 
are not latent but always-already manifest. We will not understand anything about everyday 
life as long as we seek to reduce it to epiphenomena of hidden and secret ‘structures’.  
If we are to perform an exorcism of place, when we are approaching a haunted space, we 
cannot but be on our guard. We require both integral and differential strategies – strive to a 
sense of descriptive totality as well as selective deduction. The performativity of everyday life 
is always indexical. It always points towards ‘this’ or ‘that’ shadow or resonance, which only 
make sense in a particular encounter. Just as voices indexical of demons only make sense in 
the specificity of an exorcism, so do encounters with spatial hauntings require an attunement 
to the situatedness of their revelations. 
Flow provides a new paradigm, but we have barely begun to recognise its radical potential. It 
entails much more than a new kind of demonology. The mystique of shadows and resonances 
lies not in what they hide, but in what they reveal. Not all possessions are demonic 
distortions, motivated by bad faith. Instead, everyday life is also, perhaps more so, inspired by 
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other kinds of mystical forces. The enthusiasm one feels when experiencing an existential 
moment, a moment at which the whole reveals itself in a tiny fragment or flash of light, for 
example, is of a divine nature exactly because it refuses representation and resists being 
rendered accountable via discursive practices.  
The mere fact that everyday life is too complex to be rendered accountable should not make 
us despondent. It does not mean that we have stopped making sense. Just because we do not 
have to reproduce it in terms of a more abstract scheme through which we can take a shortcut 
on our way to totality, does not mean it has become meaningless. What it might do, however, 
is install a bit more humility in our work as analysts and writers.  
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